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Security Markets in the United States and
Japan: Distinctive Aspects Molded by
Cultural, Social, Economic, and
Political Differences
By PROFESSOR DAN FENNO HENDERSON*
I. INTRODUCTION
Tokyo has now joined London and New York as one of the three
major securities markets in the world. With world capital movements
challenging even the importance of international trade in goods in the
1990s, uniform laws and business practices become a pressing goal for
the international financial community.' Yet, the cultural, social, eco-
nomic, and political contexts in which the three leading exchanges oper-
ate are indeed quite different and often controversial.' Understanding
* Professor and Director, Asian Law Program, University of Washington, Seattle.
1. The following are among the most recent articles on this topic: Symposium: Interna-
tional Securities Regulation: Recent Developments in the United States; United Kingdom, and
European Community, 16 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 1 (1990); Symposiun: Internationalization of
the Securities Markets, 9 MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 1 (1988); Symposiun: The Interna-
tionalization of the Securities Markets, 11 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 157 (1987); Symposiun.
Internationalization of the Securities Markets, 4 B.U. INT'L LJ. 1 (1986); Reece, Buyer Beware."
The United States No Longer Wants Foreign Capital to Fund Corporate Acquisitions, 18 DEN. J.
INT'L L. & PoL'Y 279 (1990).
2. The political and economic differences between the United States and Japan are being
more sharply drawn by new critics of Japan's policies for trade and investments and the Japa-
nese climate for foreign business in Tokyo. See Beyond Japan-Bashing: The Gang-of-Four
defends the Revisionist Line, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 7, 1990, at 54 (where they are
called "revisionist" (or the "Gang-of-Four")); C. PREsTowrrz, TRADING PLACES: How WE
ALLOWED JAPAN TO TAKE THE LEAD (1988); Fallows, Containing Japan, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, May 1989, at 43; Johnson, The Problem of Japan in an Era of Structural Change, 9
INT'L HousE JAPAN BULL. 1 (1989); K. VAN WOLFEREN, THE ENIGMA OF JAPANESE
POWER (1989). P. CHOATE, AGENTS OF INFLUENCE (1990) (concerning Japanese lobbying in
Washington D.C.) should now probably be added to this list. See also Fingleton, Innocents
Abroad- Eastern Economics, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 1990, at 72. Whatever one's position
may be on such issues, clearly the differences are real and require attention. The broadening of
the debate is not simply "Japan bashing" as many Japanese would like to have it labelled in
order to stifle discussion of a full range of the relationship. Nor is it probably helpful to call
them the "Gang of Four." In fact, the American scene deserves much of the same candor to
highlight our policy failures. See D. HENDERSON, FOREIGN ENTERPRISE IN JAPAN: LAWS
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these key differences is crucial to the effective uniformity of practices. It
is not likely that true uniformity which can be relied upon by investors is
possible anytime soon. Accommodating national contextual variables in
a uniform global, enforceable,3 trading system will be a major challenge
for each of the nations involved as trading around the world and around
the clock becomes more and more commonplace.
This Article will identify some distinctive features of American and
Japanese business cultures and securities markets molded by differences
in their national contexts. Such a subject is so broad that the selection of
and focus on the differences must be sharp, and the treatment of them
personal, sometimes impressionistic, in order to cover all the issues.
The United States and Japan both possess, in an overall sense, simi-
lar constitutional governments, democratic politics, free enterprise sys-
tems, market economies, justiciable private law systems, and literate
hardworking populations, all of which facilitate vigorous private sectors.
The two nations have much else in common which draws them together
to work responsibly for a better world.
However, perhaps a central contextual difference in our two socie-
ties deserves emphasis up front. It concerns the role of law and its im-
portance to individualism. Americans are perhaps at one pole on the
spectrum. Americans take their constitution seriously, and thus often
take it to court. Americans are both the most litigious and the most
individualistic of people-to a fault some would say, because it is not
clear that certain aspects of the American "me generation" are the model
of the global future. For Americans, individualism means legalistic
rights implemented by justiciable law, lawsuits, and lawyers. Indeed, for
America, over-populated by lawyers, a key social figure in the system is
the lawyer. At the other pole, the Japanese are comfortable with "do as
you are told law," and are normally submerged in, and highly disciplined
by, their social groupings, family, school, company, nation, and the like
outside the justiciable law. For the Japanese it is clearly the bureaucrat,
a position which, broadly conceived, includes all societal authority
figures in business associations and companies, schools, families, and so
on, which regularly are consulted by officialdom for a consensus of sorts.
For the Japanese, their post-World War II decentralized sociality
has borne high domestic yields, but the rewards have not been delivered
AND POLICIES ch. 6 (1983); Henderson, Access to the Japanese Market, in LAW AND TRADg
ISSUES OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMY 131 (G. Saxonhouse & K. Yamamura eds. 1986).
3. For enforcement problems, see Thomas, Icarus and His Waxen Wings: Congress At-
tempts to Address the Challenges of Insider Trading in a Globalized Securities Market, 23
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 99 (1990).
[Vol. 14
Distinctive Aspects
by a legal midwife. Law, lawsuits, and lawyers have a diminished role in
Japan,4 clearly subordinate to bureaucratic administration (authority and
discretion).
Such insights are as central to our problem as they are difficult to
articulate in the abstract. Emphatically, these polar differences include
American peculiarities as much as they do Japanese peculiarities.
Awareness of these peculiarities is all the more critical precisely because
it is their ethnocentric justiciable law that Americans, as past leaders in
global securities regulation, are prone to rely upon to adumbrate both the
New York and Tokyo markets, and to construct a global securities trad-
ing regime. Neither contracts nor law have been notably successful for
Americans' in dealing with Japan, because for over thirty years both
sides have complained about liberalization, level playing fields, targeting,
dumping, industrial espionage, protectionism, and subsidization.
From this central difference flow other differences requiring under-
standing at the outset of our study. These differences reside in Japanese
and American attitudes toward diversity, mercantilism, nationalism, and
practical commitments to sustaining an international economic order,
significantly attainable only if based on law. These basic cultural
problems will increasingly surface and must be solved if we are to create
a viable political climate for global securities markets. A justiciable legal
structure for global trading cannot be finessed. Resolute understanding
of the role of these central differences in law, and the time it will take to
develop a viable justiciable securities law in Japan, must be retained in
4. See Ramseyer, Lawyers, Foreign Lawyers, and Lawyer Substitutes: The Market For
Regulation in Japan, 27 HARv. INT'L L.J. 499 (1986); T. HATrom & D. HENDERSON, CIVIL
PROCEDURE IN JAPAN ch. 2 (1985).
5. The public understanding of the "Ron-Yasu" (Reagan-Nakasone) annual trade meet-
ings was a typical illustration of my point about the usefulness of adumbrating law: each
meeting ended with an accord to reduce the trade deficit, which the American media reports
without any historical sense, and the American reader treats as a deal, a contract. The Japa-
nese treat it as essentially an accommodating felicitation, because every knowledgeable individ-
ual understands that Nakasone, as a "mere' Prime Minister, cannot deliver, given the
Japanese social and business autonomy, and its role in the political process. But, as Clyde
Prestowitz correctly points out, our government has no "institutional memory." C.
PRsrowrrz, supra note 2, at 45. So, decade after decade we have our annual American
celebration of the end of Japanese protectionism. But still, virtually every time a foreigner has
a better product or a better price, he has consistently been stiff-armed at the border, smothered
on entry, or had his price jacked up several times before the product reached the consumer.
The SH accord is but the latest of such projects, all law and contract, as opposed to de facto
power. For a careful and academic analysis of the usefulness of trade methods other than
contract and justiciable law, see Peterson, Enforcing U.S Foreign Trade Legislation: Is There
A Need for Expanded Presidential Discretion, 24 J. WORLD TRADE 79 (1990).
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the background of all later discussions of specialized doctrine, statutes,
and institutions of the U.S. securities markets.
The points which will be discussed will indicate the depth of future
concerns. In addressing them, one is fortified by the wisdom of the late
Professor Reischaur,6 who once observed that too often the Japanese-
American dialogue has been fed on baby food too bland to nourish real
understanding.
In passing, we should note that many of the issues raised below are
related to the broadly gauged Structural Impediment Initiatives (SII)7
addressed in 1990 by reports between the governments of the United
States and Japan. These reports have identified some major issues on
both sides, but the shortcomings of the reports lie precisely in the as-
sumptions they might raise in American minds that the problems might
be resolved without realistic implementation. After all, the Maekawa
Report addressed some of the same issues (e.g. land use) in Japan nearly
five years ago, and if anything the problems have been intensified in the
interim, rather than solved.
I. DISTINCTIVE SYSTEMIC FEATURES IN
CORPORATE LAW
A. Macro-Comparisons
Our study will begin with an overall comparison of the U.S. and
Japanese corporate legal systems. This analysis, despite its intricacies,
may be the easiest. Defining a security or an insider are technical
6. ASAHI SHIMBUN STAFF, PACIFIC RIVALS 2 (Tokyo 1972).
7. The Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) negotiations between the governments of
the United States and Japan produced an agreement signed June 28, 1990. See Key Elements
of U.S.-Japan Structural Impediments Initiative Joint Report Released By U.S. T.R., June 28,
1990, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1014 (July 4, 1990). Japan agreed to take action on the
following basic structural issues among others which have impeded foreign access for decades-
more public investment in infrastructure; better land use; more rationalized distribution; more
antimonopoly enforcement; reduced cartels and combines (keiretsu); improved the protection
of technology; and lowered consumer prices on imports, which have consistently for decades
been marked-up unreasonably before they get to consumers.
The United States committed itself to reduce the federal deficit; promote saving; reform
product liability law; and improve education, among other obvious and basic flaws. Although
the SI1 identifies obvious and basic problems on both sides, there is much room for skepticism
about the implementation of such an agreement given the decades of foot dragging history of
Japanese "liberalization," and American excessive consumerism or the "now and me genera-
tion" existent for a full twenty years with very little national leadership to point the way out.
For additional strong reservations about the value of such an exercise without constant prcs-
sure for compliance and especially without leadership from the policy establishment in Wash-




problems of great specialized importance to securities regulations,
whether national or international. But technical definitions do not travel
well across national boundaries or across linguistic and cultural barriers,
and are best dealt with by specialists. Here we will discuss four general
differences in the corporate legal systems of the United States and Japan.
The understanding of these differences is important to all efforts to stand-
ardize across national boundaries.
Turning first to the broadest contours of both nations' corporate
laws, is the fact that Japan is a civil-law country with its own juristic
method and structure of corporate law, typical of a code system, as op-
posed to American corporate law which is couched in a common-law
context. Japanese corporate law is codified as Book II of a very system-
atic Commercial Code' with the usual general provisions (sosoku) and
special divisions (hen: "books") integrated with special statutes (tokuho),
in turn systematically interrelated to other codes in the civil-law system. 9
The Commercial Code was first enacted in 1898, mostly fashioned after
German models. It was substantially amended before World War II in
1938 and again after World War H in 1951. The 1951 amendments
strengthened the board of directors and also strengthened individual
shareholder's rights. Under the auspices of the Allied Occupation, the
1951 amendments brought to the code a substantial overlay of American
corporate law, drawn largely from Illinois state laws." The amendment
process has continued1 right up to the present with amendments in 1990
which distinguish between the treatment of large and small corporations,
and require higher minimal capital for stock corporations (kabushiki kai-
sha, KK), in an attempt to encourage small enterprises to use the Lim-
ited Liability Company (yugen-kaisha, YK). Despite the infusion of
American law and the recent amendments, the corporate law, in concept
and method, is essentially civil in nature.
American corporate law on the other hand, is a statutory overlay on
8. Sh6h6 (Commercial Code), Law No. 48 of 1899 [SH6H6] (Eibun-Hrei-Sha trans.
1983). This is a convenient translation. However, as with any translation, it will prove inade-
quate when the operative Japanese is subjected to pressures in solving problems or interpreta-
tion and application. See, eg., infra note 30.
9. As with all codes in the civil law system, the General Provisions may apply to all of the
subdivisions of the code; in the case of juristic persons, the General Provisions of the whole
Commercial Code apply, SH6H6 arts. 1-51; additionally, the General Provisions of corporate
law will apply, SH6H6 bk. II, and sometimes the General Provisions of the Civil Code must be
applied, eg., Mon6 arts. 33-84.
10. Blakemore & Yazawa, Japanese Commercial Code Revision--Concerning Corpora-
tions, 2 AM. J. CoMp. L. 12 (1953).
11. See Zadankai, Kaisha-hjkaisei o megutte (Symposium: Concerning the Revision of the
Corporate Law), JuRisuTo, Sept. 15, 1990.
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the common-law system, consisting in part of state enabling statutes and
of federal regulatory (public) law, and also of private law by way of pri-
vate causes of action. The American corporate law is largely embodied
in different state statutes with some diversity of language, rules, and case
law interpretations, not to mention the federal overlay. Still further di-
versity may be expected by way of accruing and ongoing decisional law
interpreting each state's statutes. Though Japan is developing significant
case law, there remains a significant difference.
A second major systemic difference between American and Japanese
corporate laws is.that Japan's is a unitary system with one Commercial
Code (including Book II on Corporations) for the entire country,
whereas American enabling statutes are state laws. These vary from
state to state, and there are thus fifty corporate statutes in the United
States.12 So, except for the federal securities regilations enacted in the
1930s, it is not possible to speak of American corporate law as such 3
when addressing a specific legal problem in one of the fifty states. Of
course it is necessary to seek answers to these legal problems in the cases
or provisions in the statutes of the specific state. For ultimate answers it
is necessary to go to the supreme court of the specific state involved.
This said, two factors which have somewhat reduced the apparent
diversity in American corporate law are worth emphasis. The first is the
Revised Model Business Corporation Code (1984) sponsored by the Amer-
12. In fact, there are probably two or three hundred state statutes, because many states
have separate laws for utilities, insurance, or banking corporations. For a survey of these
complexities, see Conard, An Overview of the Laws of Corporations, 71 MICH. L. REV. 62 1,
624-31 (1973).
13. Recently, especially in the past decade, there has been unprecedented interest in, and
American controversy over, corporate law. From this ferment have emerged two important
national projects within professional lawyers' organizations attempting to reach their own con-
sensus in matters of corporate governance. These are still in progress and are still controver-
sial, largely because the future is obscure as to the basic role of equity finance in our large
public corporations which are increasingly held by so-called institutions and managed by fin-
anciers rather than production people. Both projects center around the Model Business Cor-
poration Act originally sponsored by the American Bar Association, Committee on Corporate
Law, and published originally by the American Law Institute in the 1960s. The first of the
new projects attempting to review and restate basic principles of corporate law is the American
Law Institute project. Principles of Corporate Governance and Structure: Restatement and
Recommendations, Revised Model Business Corporation Act, Tentative Draft No. 1 (Apr.
1982). The second project is a revision of the Model Act sponsored by the ABA Committee on
Corporate Law. The Revised Model Corporation Law was published in 1988, REPORT OP TIE
COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE LAWS OF THE SECTION OF CORPORATIONS, BANKING, AND
BUSINESS LAW OF THE ABA (Mar. 1983) and the ALI project is still publishing Tentative
Drafts, eg., Tentative Draft No. 10 (Apr. 6, 1990). For a review and comparison, see Gold-
stein, The Relationship Between the Model Business Corporation Act and the Principles of Cor-
porate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 501 (1984).
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ican Bar Association (ABA). It has been followed to a great extent in the
statutes of more than thirty-five states, and thus has had a unifying effect
on states' corporate laws. Another unifying factor in American law can
perhaps be identified in the work of the American Law Institute's project
on Principles of Corporate Governance, which is important, ongoing,
and too complex to measure in passing.
Two states especially influence American securities law. Delaware
and California offer important variations in this area: California because
it is such a large state with somewhat more concern in its law for share-
holder protection, and Delaware because so many major listed corpora-
tions are established there to enjoy the flexibility which that state's law
allows corporate management. Delaware has won the "race to laxity,"
14
though in the long competition, nearly all other states have gone the lax-
ity route. New York also has many companies incorporated under its
law.
Another unifying factor in American law is the Federal Securities
Regulations, first enacted between 1933 and 1934.15 These regulations,
after nearly sixty years of accruing administrative and judicial experi-
ence, have become the matrix for new private actions (unknown in Ja-
pan) which enable firms or individuals to sue for damages or enforce
management liabilities for fraud or other corporate rights and obliga-
tions. This federalizing process has produced a body of national corpo-
rate law, eclipsing the diverse state law in several areas of interstate
commerce.
The federal laws and regulations are administered initially by the
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), an independent federal regula-
tory agency, without parallel in Japan except possibly the unique Fair
Trade Commission (Kisei Torihiki Iinkai) which is concerned with un-
fair trade practices and the antimonopoly law. Also accruing from the
Federal Securities Regulations is an accumulation of case law refining
these aspects of corporate law.
In a third area of comparison between Japanese and American cor-
porations law, it is the Japanese law which is diverse and also more sys-
14. This is Professor Conard's phrase, which he adopted from Justice Brandeis' dissent in
Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 558-59 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). For cer-
tain, the laxity trend has produced the governance problem. See Conard, supra note 12, at
631-38; see also Romano, The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law, in CORPORATE
LAW AND ECONoMIC ANALYsIs 216-54 (M.L. Bebehuck ed. 1990).
15. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa; Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. §§ 78a-78M. See L. Loss & J. SELIGMAN, SECURIEs REGULATION (3d ed. 1989-90);
Sargent, A Sense of Order. The Virtues and Limitations of Doctrinal Analysis, 104 HAMry. L
REv. 634 (1990) (this is a useful review of the monumental treatise by Loss and Seligman).
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tematic. What its significance is, if any, to the securities trade, is difficult
to assess in the abstract. But it is an important feature in the
background.
Book II of the Japanese Commercial Code provides for three types
of juristic persons (hjin): the partnership corporation (gomei-kaisha),a6
limited partnership corporation (goshi-kaisha),17 and the stock corpora-
tion (kabushiki kaisha, KK).II In addition, the limited liability company
(yugen-kaisha, YK)19 was established by special statute in 1938. Only
the KK is designed to be a publicly held entity with shares listed and sold
on the stock exchanges. The practice has departed from the design, how-
ever. Nearly a million tiny close corporations have been organized as
KK, eschewing the legal entities provided for them in the law. Of
course, none of them are listed.
In contrast, the corporate laws of the several American states have
never envisaged but one corporate form, perhaps because, historically,
partnerships were widely used and well-developed in practice and in the
common law for small businesses and the professions. Practice soon ne-
cessitated special formulae for close corporations, 2° presumably as much
for tax reasons as for limited liability. More than half of the state stat-
utes contain special provisions or options for corporations with only a
few shareholders, all or most of whom are to be active in the manage-
ment of the corporate business. Nevertheless, the American law has not
developed the dichotomy between public and private companies such as
the German GmbH adopted by Japan. 21 Generally, American business
16. SHOH6 arts. 62-145.
17. Id arts. 146-164.
18. Id. arts. 165-456.
19. Yugen-kaisha-h6 (Limited Liability Company Law), Law No. 74 of 1938.
20. Until the last 25 or 30 years, the close corporation has been a stepchild in American
law. Close corporation has been but a term of convenience. Only recently has it begun to
appear in statutes with new legal significance. See F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, O'NEAL's
CLOSE CORPORATIONS (3d ed. 1987) (standard work). DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 341-356
(1974) was perhaps the first state statute to define and treat in detail close corporations as a
separate legislative problem, though North Carolina and Florida pioneered in scattering help.
ful provisions in their general corporate laws. For a recent history of close corporations in the
various American states, see Kajala, An Analysis of Close Corporation Legislation in the
United States, 21 ARiz. ST. L.J. 663 (1989). In Japan, the LLC is governed by a special
statute, Yugen-kaisha-h6, supra note 19, but many entities are incorporated, instead, as stock
corporations (kabushiki kaisha, KK). Many lucid comparative insights may be found in
Shishido, Problems of the Closely Held Corporation: A Comparative Study of the Japanese and
American Legal Systems and a Critique of the Japanese Tentative Draft on Close Corporations,
38 AM. J. COMP. L. 337 (1990); D. HENDERSON, RETHINKING THE CLOSE CORPORATION IN
JAPAN (1990); Karijala, The Closely Held Enterprise Under Japanese Law, 7 B.U. INT'L L.J.
229 (1989).
21. The German Gesellschaft mit beschrdnkter Haftung (GmbH) is a juristic person spe-
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corporate law envisages a single type of juristic person. But the general
corporation must be tailored by contract and by provisions in the bylaws
or articles (under special statutory rules in most states) for convenience
in forming a close corporation, ,which until recently' was not a formal
legal term in the statutes.
A new classification of KK was created in 1974 by amendment to
the Commercial Code and by special statutes' enacted at the same time.
Further amendments took place in 1981.24 Under these changes all KKs
are classified by size into three classes, each of which has different audit-
ing regimes of increasing strictness by size:
1. 500 million yen or more in capital, or over twenty billion yen in
borrowings;
2. 100 million yen to 500 million yen; and
3. under 100 million yen.
This reform in some ways resembles the additional auditing and ac-
counting practices imposed on listed corporations by federal securities
regulations in the United States, though the statutory methods and en-
forcement techniques are quite different.
The fourth systemic difference between the U.S. and Japanese cor-
porate laws is the rigid mandatory nature of the Japanese code. This
raises theoretical questions concerning the basis of a corporation and the
role of contracts in its underpinning, an issue of great interest in both
countries, particularly among academics, in recent years. In Japan, this
rigidity of mandatory provisions is found primarily in the KK. Designed
specifically to be a publicly held corporation, the KK is much more rig-
cially designed for a limited number of shareholders and for situations similar to American
close corporations. The GmbH was the model for the Japanese limited liability company
(yugen-kaisha). In English, see Oliver, THE PRIVATE COMPANY IN GERMANY: A TRANsLA-
TION AND COMMENTARY (2d ed. 1986), for a description of the German GmbH.
22. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 341-356 (1974). These 16 provisions are applicable to
close corporations, as defined in the law, and comprise subchapter XIV of the Delaware Code.
See Kaijala, An Analysis of Close Corporation Legislation in the United States, supra note 20, at
670 (1989).
23. Sh6h5 no ichiba a kaisei suru h~ritsu (Law to Amend a Part of the Commercial
Code), Law No. 21 of 1974; Kabushiki kaisha no kansa nado ni kansuru Sh~h6 no tokurei ni
kansuru h~ritsu (Law on Special Cases under the Commercial Code on the Audit of Stock
Corporations), Law No. 22 of 1974; Sh6h5 no ichibu o kaisei suru h~ritsu to no shik5 ni
tomonau kankei h6ritsu no seiri ni kansuru h6ritsu (Law Concerning Adjustments in Related
Laws Accompanying the Enforcement of the Law to Amend a Part of the Commercial Code),
Law No. 23 of 1974.
24. Law No. 74 of 1981. For a summary of the 1981 amendments to this law and other
aspects of the Commercial Code and special laws, see Motoki, Kosugi, & Johnson, Explana-
tion of the Amended Stock Corporation Law, 2 JAPAN Bus. L.J. 309 (1981).
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idly structured by mandatory rules and less subject to change by agree-
ment than corporations set up under most American state statutes.
The following aspects of the KK are worth emphasizing: (1) the
Japanese formation procedures are very formal as to initial organization,
capital pay-in, and registration procedures for the charter;25 (2) major
changes such as amendments, mergers, and sale of assets require high
fixed minimal votes and the like;26 (3) accounting provisions in the Com-
mercial Code are similarly formal and rigid compared to American stat-
utes, though the SEC rules largely bridge this gap in the circumstances
covered by federal law.
B. Micro-Comparisons
Switching now from macro-comparisons of the corporate law sys-
tems to micro-comparisons within the KK and the U.S. corporation, it is
important to highlight a few salient differences of interest to those deal-
ing with corporate law and securities. Of a multitude of such micro-
differences in the rules and corporate institutions, the following features
will at least indicate the importance of this aspect of harmonization. The
features listed are only the more prominent humps and bumps, spots and
stripes, which distinguish these two legal beasts. Taken together, they
should be of interest to foreign investment counsel from both nations,
though this listing is only indicative of many other corporate problems.
Of course, a uniform corporate law such as that under consideration in
the European Community27 would be an ultimate solution for global
trading, enabling the United States and Japan to trade shares with the
same legal characteristics. The characteristics are as follows:
a. The legal conception of the KK, as noted, is a more mandatory
structure, relatively less malleable by contract than the American
corporation. 28
b. In the KK, formation is formal and rigid, with a number of specified
25. See Henderson, Threshold Advice to American Incorporation in Japan, in CURRVNT
LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN AND EAST ASIA 76 (J. Haley ed. 1978).
26. D. HENDERSON, FOREIGN ENTERPRISE IN JAPAN: LAWS AND POLICIES ch. 13
(1985) [hereinafter D. HENDERSON, FOREIGN ENTERPRISE IN JAPAN].
27. Work on the European Corporation law is reviewed in Carreau & Lee, Toward a
European Company Law, 9 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 501 (1989).
28. For a review of the recent American literature on this debate, see Bebehuk, Limiting
Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments,
102 HARV. L. REV. 1820 (1989). See also Bebchuk, The Debate on Contractual Freedom in
Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395 (1989); Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990
DUKE L.J. 201.
For materials comparing American and Japanese corporate law, see M. Tatsuta & D.
Henderson, Japanese Business Corporation Law (mimeo ed. 1985) (available at the University
[Vol. 14
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prerequisites which must be satisfied punctiliously before the corpo-
ration can be registered, come into existence, and begin business.2 9
Recent amendments to the Commercial Code, effective April 1,
1991, have relaxed some of these rigidities. Examples of these rigid
formalities in corporate formation of the KK are:
1. At least seven incorporators" (hokkinin) must sign the charter
(teikan), and there must be at least one subscriber3" besides the
seven incorporators (eight in all) in order to avoid the onerous
court approvals required to assure compliance with formalities
when only incorporators participate in formation.
2. The corporation's purpose clause must specifically describe the
business in which the corporation will engage. The catchall
enumeration or the broad generalizations of American state law
may be unacceptable at the Japanese Registry.32 This makes ul-
tra vires more of a concern in Japan than in the United States,
though in litigation ultra vires is seldom found against
defendants.33
3. Certain items can only bind the corporation if they are inserted
in the charter.34 These include:
(i) contributions in kind;35
(ii) benefits to be received by incorporators;
36
(iii) pre-incorporation arrangements by the corporation to take
over property after it comes into existence; the property
value and its transferor must be specified; 37 and
(iv) incorporation expenses to be borne by the new
of Washington); M. Tatsuta & R. Kummert, Cases and Materials on Japanese and U.S. Busi-
ness Corporation Law (mimeo temp. ed. 1988) (available at the University of Washington).
29. See D. HENDERSON, FOREIGN ENTERPRISE IN JAPAN, supra note 26; SH6H6 art. 165.
30. The Japanese term "hokkinin" is translated "promoter" in EHS, but "incorporator"
is preferable; hokkinin had quite different roles from our promoters. The standardized English
equivalents, which I use for Japanese legal terms, may be found in D. HENDERSON, J. HALEY
& F. RAND, A JAPANESE-ENGLISH GLOSSARY (1985). Note that the recent amendments to
the Commercial Code, effective April 1, 1991, have abolished the requirement seven incorpora-
tors; only one will be required.
31. SH6H6 art. 173.
32. For judicial discussion of ultra vires, see Arita v. Kojima, 24 Minshii 625 (June 24,
1970), aff'g 19 Kosai Minshii 7 (Jan. 31, 1966). English translations, T. HATrORI & D. HEN-
DESON, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JAPAN B-24 (1985).
33. Takeuchi, Kaishah ni okeru ultra vires no gensoku wa donoy nishite haikisubeki ka?,
1965 AMERIKA H6 20 (English translation by Henderson, How Should We Abolish the Ultra
Vires Doctrine in Corporation Law?, 2 LAw IN JAPAN 140 (1968)).
34. SH6H6 art. 168.
35. Id, art. 168(5).
36. I1d art. 168(4).
37. Id art. 168(6).
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corporation.38
4. Before presentation to the Registry office, the charter must be
notarized by a public notary (koshonin) and registered at the no-
tary's office to assure compliance with all code requirements.
39
5. One-fourth of a KK's authorized capital"' must be paid into a
designated bank account. The bank must certify its receipt
before the Registry of the Ministry of Justice will formally regis-
ter the company.
6. Court appointed inspectors must approve contributions in kind
4'
and their values-a cumbersome, fixed procedure which takes
time.
All of these and other rigidities of Japanese corporate for-
mation law contrast sharply with the simple filing of a document
of incorporation (often by a single incorporator) under Ameri-
can state statutes. Functional equivalents of these Japanese con-
straints on pay-in of capital are found in the United States, only
in the federal securities law, if at all.
c. The issue of the validity of promoters' contracts, in the American
sense, is not a concern of Japanese corporation law. Only incorpora-
tors' contracts listed in a corporation's charter bind the corporation
after it comes into existence. Otherwise, only promoters are bound
in transactions intended for corporate formation. The promoter's li-
ability is derived from the Civil Code42 on obligations, not the corpo-
rate law.
d. It is probably fair to say that the implementation of corporate de-
mocracy by the shareholders' meetings of large corporations is the
major unsolved problem in both the U.S. and Japanese corporate law
systems, and resides at the core of the ongoing discussion of corpo-
rate governance. In both nations, shareholders must and do rely on
representation by management. Issues genuinely contested by share-
holder votes are exceptional, and center around rare intraboard ri-
valries expressed by a proxy contest. Recent American institutional
investors' use of the proxy system 43 has not been emulated in Japan.
38. Id. art. 168(7).
39. Id. art. 167. Note that the Japanese public notary (Koshonin) is a much more struc-
tured official of civilian origin than our notary public.
40. Id. art. 166, S 3.
41. Id. arts. 173(1), 181(1). This requirement will be relaxed under the 1990 amendment,
effective in 1991.
42. MINP6 bk. III.
43. See Institutions Expected to Pursue Shareholder Proposals Agressively, 21 Sec. Reg. &
L. Rep. (BNA) No. 21, at 202 (Feb. 3, 1989).
[Vol. 14
Distinctive Aspects
Otherwise, shareholders concerned about mismanagement sim-
ply vote by selling on the stock exchange. Even the rash of leveraged
buy outs, takeovers, and tender offers in America in the 1980s is but
another manifestation of voting by selling as the only meaningful
expression of shareholder concern. The fact that control is in es-
sence, a stake, raises a host of other unrelated issues related to mi-
nority protection.
Equity (and therefore the shareholder) is not nearly as impor-
tant in Japan as it is in the United States; rather, debt is predomi-
nant. This lends to another difference: Japanese management
manages shareholders differently, not in law, but in practice. One
management technique is the "stable shareholder," explained more
fully below, which is implemented by cross-shareholdings within the
establishment. Another technique is more directly concerned with
the managing of shareholder meetings, and centers around a profes-
sional shareholder. These sokai-ya, or shareholder meeting opera-
tors, extort favors from management in exchange for not causing
trouble at shareholder meetings, or for facilitating, by a sort of guer-
rilla tactic, smooth and short shareholder meetings. By 1981 sokai-
ya practices had become truly institutionalized in many corpora-
tions. The purpose of sokai-ya is to enable management to avoid
criticism and to get through meetings quickly, generally under thirty
minutes.44
In 1981 attempts were made, by amendment to the Commercial
Code, to thwart the illegal activities of sokai-ya and managers alike.
The changes have apparently been successful to curtail, if not com-
pletely eradicate, the sokai-ya.45
In the American practice there has been no exact equivalent to
sokai-ya working with management to manage the shareholders.
But in the 1980s plenty of management and financial practices were
costly to the public shareholders, not to mention the taxpayer.
There are ample ill-defined conflicts of interests and malpractices of
management which the law has yet to fully sort out and rectify. In
the areas of leveraged buy outs, two-tiered tender offers, poison pills,
green mail, and golden parachutes, as well as programmed trading,
insider trading, and savings and loan flascos accompanied by junk
44. A good summary of the sokai-ya institution before the 1981 amendments is found in
Japan v. Yasumo, 23 KEisH0 1359 (Oct. 16, 1969), a criminal case wherein SHOHO arts.
494(1)(1) and (2) were applied to convict a corporate officer who dealt with sokai-ya.
45. SH6H6 arts. 294-2, 237-4(3), 497. See Takeuchi, Shareholders Meetings Under the
Revised Commercial Code, 20 LAw IN JAPAN 173 (1987).
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bond speculations, a host of legal problems have been raised in the
courts, running about a decade behind the fast deals. Thus, Ameri-
can individual shareholders have their problems too, despite the ab-
sence of the sokai-ya, and the general shareholder meeting certainly
holds little promise of becoming useful to the ordinary shareholder
any time soon. There is, however, an enormous difference in the use
of equity finance in Japan and the United States, and therefore in the
role of the shareholder. The difference inheres in the sociology of the
corporate world and the mechanisms of finance within the politico-
business establishment.46
e. As in America, the board of directors in Japan is responsible for
management of the corporation,47 though the Japanese board is nor-
mally made up of insiders who are corporate managers as well.48
Strictly speaking, Japanese directors do not have fiduciary du-
ties. The duties of American directors are derived from trust princi-
ples, in turn derived from the historical Anglo-American division of
law and equity. Equity of this sort is, of course, unknown to the civil
law tradition.49 Instead, the Japanese director's duties to the corpo-
ration are defined in terms of the law of mandates50 from the Civil
Code, and special provisions in the corporate law define other du-
ties.51 Whether the differences in abstract verbal formulae make for
any distinctions between U.S. and Japanese practice is questionable,
given massive U.S. legal dilution in the name of the business judg-
ment rule.
Similarly, there is no provision in the Japanese Code for an
American-type executive committee (or other committees commonly
provided for in American law, articles, or bylaws). In fact, senior
directors with informal designations as officers usually act collec-
46. See infra text accompanying notes 79-93.
47. SH6H6 art. 260.
48. For control and management of the KK, see Tatanta, Governance and Shareholders'
Rights under the Corporation Law, in M. Tatsuta & R. Kummert, supra note 28, at 5.1-18, 6-
112.
49. Kondo, The Management Liability of Directors, 20 LAW IN JAPAN 150 (1987), The
dilution of the fiduciary duties of the American boards of large American corporations is still a
problem, crying for solution. See generally Takeuchi, Should There be a General Provision on
the Social Responsibility of Enterprises in the Commercial Code, 11 LAW IN JAPAN 37 (1978)
(general aspects of the Japanese debate); C. Heftel, Corporate Governance in Japan: The Posi-
tion of Shareholders in Publicly Held Corporations, 5 U. HAW. L. REV. 135 (1983).
50. MINP6 arts. 643-56.
51. SHO6 arts. 254-3, 264, 265, 266(1), 293-5(5). See Kondo, supra note 49.
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tively as a management committee (jomukai).5 2 Other committees
may be set up by special informal rules of the board.
The Japanese corporate law does not provide for a set of officers
elected by the board with specific authorities and duties, as in Ameri-
can law. In Japanese practice, the corporation may have (indeed
usually does have) a president (shacho), vice president (fuku-
shacho), and other officers. These positions are informal and are
mandated by board rules, but are not defined as such in the Commer-
cial Code.
Instead, the Commercial Code provides for a legal agent elected
by the board of directors53 and designated by law as the Representa-
tive Director (daihy5 torishimariyaku). He must be registered as
such at the branch office of the Ministry of Justice. As the code is
structured, he alone is the officer with authority to bind the corpora-
tion. Other officers may do so by power of attorney or by apparent
authority,54 subject to recent limitations to the effect that certain ac-
tions may not be delegated by the Board to a single director."
f. The Japanese Code provides for no formal bylaws as found in Ameri-
can corporations. Informal rules, if they exist at all, are creatures of
optional board actions, and do not provide for variations in the
decision-making process, such as quorums, votes, or shifts between
corporate committees, directors, or shareholders, as is often allowed
by state statutes in the United States.
g. There are some major differences between the Japanese and U.S.
legal systems for large public corporations. The formal differences,
not discussed in this Article, include substantive variations, as well
as differing means and, indeed, differing degrees of legal
enforcement.
5 6
The Japanese Commercial Code provides for a corporate ac-
52. For managing directors' meetings (jmukaO, see M. Tatsuta and RL Kummert, supra
note 28, at 6-112.
53. SH6H6 art. 261.
54. MkL art. 262.
55. Id. art. 260(2).
56. See Baum, Japanese Capital Markets: New Legislation, 22 LAW IN JAPAN (1989) (as-
sessment in English of Japan's recent rules for insiders); Note, Regulation of Inside Trading in
Japan, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1296 (1989) (authored by Tornoko A. Kashi); K. OKAMURA & C.
TAKESKITA, LAWS AND REGULATION RELATING TO INSIDER TRADING IN JAPAN (Tokyo
1989) (part I includes English translations of the new ministerial ordinances; part II is a synop-
sis of the changes; and part III has the laws in the official Japanese language). For pre-amend.
ment law, see Ishizumi, Insider Trading Regulation:. An Examination of Section 16(b) and a
Proposalfor Japan, 47 FORDHAM L. REv. 449 (1979).
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
counting officer known as an auditor (kansayaku),17 and for special
accountant auditors (kaikei kansanin) for larger corporations,-8 all
of whom are perceived as representing the shareholders' interests in-
side the corporate law, and not in the regulatory law as American
certified public accountants (CPAs) are. The Commercial Code also
requires reports (balance sheets, profit and loss statements, proposals
for distribution of surplus profits, and operating reports) to issue
from the board to the auditor (and accounting auditor), and then to
the shareholders for approval.5 9 These reports must be approved by
the board and the auditors (and accountant auditors) before they are
presented to the general shareholders' annual (in practice often semi-
annual) meeting.
These provisions for accounting and operational supervision by
auditors within the KKs become more stringent for KKs of larger
capitalizations (or borrowings). The law requires that CPAs staff the
accountant auditor's positions.' Powers of examination and super-
vision of directors' operations are also included in the laws.
Without elaborating here on the considerable complexity of
these accounting mechanisms within the Commercial Code and sub-
sidiary statutes, it is sufficient to state that accountability is built into
the Commercial Code and special statutes for corporations, rather
than imposed largely from the outside by regulatory law as in the
American federal rubric.61 Japanese law does, however, impose fur-
ther regulation of accounts, and mandates disclosure for listed cor-
porations, by way of the securities regulations, 62 which are
patterned after the American practice. Prior to various amendments
57. SHOH6 arts. 273. See Motoki, Kosugi, & Johnson, supra note 24.
58. Large corporations are those with 500 million yen equity capital, or borrowings of
twenty billion yen. Smith, The 1974 Revision of the Commercial Code and Related Legislation,
7 LAW IN JAPAN 113, 120 (1974); see also Kabushiki keisha no kansa t5 ni kansuru shohd no
tokurei ni kansuru hdritsu (Law for Special Exceptions to the Commercial Code Concerning
Audits of Stock Corporations), Law No. 22 of 1974, art. 2 [hereinafter Law No. 22 of 1974].
59. SH6H6 art. 281.
60. Law No. 22 of 1974, arts. 2, 4.
61. See L. Loss & J. SELIGMAN, supra note 15, at 687-743 (1989). Note however, that tile
ABA recommendations for an audit committee within the board of directors, comprised of
outside directors, are a similar attempt to avoid management's (inside directors') self-serving
control of audits. Corporate Director's Guidebook, 32 Bus. LAW. 5, 36 (1976).
62. Shoken torihiki-h6 (Securities Exchange Law), Law No. 25 of 1950, art. 193-2(1). See
M. TArSUTA, SEcuRmEs REGULATION IN JAPAN 57 (1970). For an authoritative commen-
tary, see W. HORIGUCHI, KOMMENTARU SHOKEN TORIHIKI-H6 (rev. ed. 1985). See also JAP-
ANESE SECURITIES LAW (L. Loss, M. Yazawa, & B. Banoff eds. 1983) (the material in thuis




in 1974 and 1981, the CPA's audit, under the Japanese securities
regulations, occurred after the shareholders had approved the
board's accounts as reported to them by the board and examined by
the auditor, making it difficult to rectify errors at that late date.
The securities regulations are administered by the Ministry of
Finance, not an independent regulatory agency such as the SEC.
The workings of Ministry surveillance are not transparent, and there
has been only very exceptional judicial involvement to date.
h. Major corporate changes (charter amendments, mergers, sales of as-
sets, dissolution, and the like) cannot be made in the KK by less
than a two-thirds vote of a quorum (majority of issued shares).63
This mandatory vote can be enlarged but not reduced by its charter.
This system is consistent with the overall rigid and mandatory con-
ception of the KK. According to the weight of Japanese authority,
votes more onerous than two-thirds for major classes in the KK may
be required by its charter. Of course, the interplay between charter
and bylaw provisions in allocating power and fixing decision making
processes is not available in a KK because the Code does not provide
for bylaws. Bylaws which act as a repository of decision making
rules, and which are sometimes changeable by the board of directors,
are a convenience to American management not found in Japan,
where either no change is permitted at all in Code vote or quorum
rules, or changes must be made in the charter.
i. Japanese laws require that directors' remuneration also be approved
by the general shareholders' meeting." This is done by the board in
the United States, and sometimes a special committee is involved.
Only recently has there been an American move to address this
widely perceived conflict of interest by setting up compensation com-
mittees of outside directors.65 Compensation of directors of public
corporations is several times higher on average in America than in
Japan.
The foregoing listing of distinctive features that differ in the United
States and Japanese corporations, while not intended to be exhaustive or
systematic, conveys a sense of the importance of the uniformity of securi-
ties markets as a long-term goal. This uniformity will facilitate trading in
legally similar shares of a legally similar entity across national
boundaries.
63. SH6H6 arts. 245, 342, 343, 405.
64. Id, art. 269.
65. Corporate Director's Guidebook, supra note 61, at 36.
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III. SOCIAL DIFFERENCES INSIDE THE U.S. AND
JAPANESE CORPORATION
As reviewed briefly above, it is evident that the basic conception,
statutory structure, and specific legal features, as well as the juristic
method, of Japanese corporate law differ considerably from the Ameri-
can counterpart. The differences in actual government and business
practices surrounding the corporation, however, are even more contex-
tual and striking. A few of the more salient points of contrasting corpo-
rate culture and sociology are discussed below. Despite their continuing
importance, these differences are constantly changing, and vary with
time and specific circumstances. 66 Only the outstanding features can be
suggested somewhat impressionistically.
A. The Familial Firm
At the level of the firm, Japan has had distorted labor and capital
markets. As implemented in the Japanese business structure, the post-
World War II American styled imports of labor law, antitrust law, and
securities regulations are puzzling to the American visitor. Japanese bus-
inessmen have the same difficulty when exploring these basics of business
regulation in the United States. Even though the Japanese closely fol-
lowed American verbal models when they were enacted during the Allied
Occupation (1945-1952), the Japanese laws work quite differently. In-
deed, they hardly work at all, in the American sense. However, the alter-
native methods used in Japan, which largely circumvent American
expectations of these laws, have worked quite well for Japan in interna-
tional competition.
Actually, under these laws, the Japanese labor movement never de-
veloped the stand-off between union labor and management, characteris-
tic of the American industrial relations regime. The reason, in a word, is
the captive enterprise union (kigyd-kumiai).67 By use of the enterprise
union, labor relations are confined within the company and follow a
66. See H.J. SHAPIRO & T. COSENZA, REVIVING INDUSTRY IN AMERICA: JAPANESE
INFLUENCES ON MANUFACTURING AND THE SERVICE SECTOR 3-30 (1987) (this description
of the familial firm and the family of firms is drawn from D. HENDERSON, FOREIGN ENTER-
PRISE IN JAPAN, supra note 26, ch. IV); see also Kenkyu, Kigyo no hoshakaigaku (Legal Sociol-
ogy of the Enterprise), 38 HOSHAIKAIGAKU 87 (1986). For an overview of ways in which the
Japanese system (enterprise union, seniority promotion, life employment, etc.) has changed in
the 1980s and may change in the future, see Aoki, The Japanese Firm in Transition, in 1-3 THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF JAPAN: THE DOMESTIC TRANSFORMATION (K. Yamamura & Y,
Yasuba eds. 1987) [hereinafter POLITICAL ECONOMY OF JAPAN].
67. See Shirai, A Theory of Enterprise Unionism, in CONTEMPORARY INDUSTRIAL RELA-
TIONS IN JAPAN 117 (T. Shirai ed. 1983).
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more Confucianistic, familial model.68 There were exceptions to this
general attitude in the early years, and even now, evidenced by the gov-
ernment employee unions. The recent privatization of the National Rail-
way System has already rid commuters of some of the inconveniences of
American style antagonism in labor relations. The teachers' union is per-
haps the prime remaining example of western styled leftist labor confron-
tation in Japan.
In private business however, the Japanese enterprise union has be-
come the key bargaining unit. It is more cooperative than combative for
reasons that are obvious, after careful scrutiny of the sociology within the
company itself. It is because the company is more of a community, in
which labor is not simply a commodity or a cost of doing business. In
this sense, workers, along with the managers, are really members of the
communal company. Ideally, they are employed for life. In fact, during
the high growth of Japanese industries, and especially in the large export
companies, this ideal has largely been realized for a core of stable em-
ployees. These permanent employees stay with the company and know
that their own future depends on the success which their labor can cause
the company to enjoy. The same is true of managers, who are also life-
time members, and who generally do not move from company to com-
pany for a price. Managers can therefore invest in training and in caring
for their labor because they will all stay with the company and will re-
turn favors. Opportunities for lateral career moves are decidedly lower
and, indeed, managerial reluctance to hire laterally helps generate the
familial form.
Also, part of this system is the use of temporary employees, often
quite numerous, who earn lower pay, and are disproportionately female.
These employees are not "members"; they serve as an employment cush-
ion because they are the ones laid off in a downturn. Small subcontract-
ing firms serve a similar function. Both temporary employees and
subcontractors receive second class treatment, yet their second class
treatment is also part of the system. Due to necessity, they tolerate their
insecurity and low pay.
One contributing factor to this situation is the fact that Japanese
corporations need to pay much less attention to shareholders, so that in
no small degree the business is run for power and market share, or for
the privileged permanent work force and the corps of elite managers. In
such a setting, imported American labor law, premised on a union-man-
68. Murakami, le Society as a Pattern of Civilization, 10 J. JAPANESE STUD. 281, 356-57
(1984).
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agement standoff, whether inspired by Marx or Gompers, was from the
beginning a misfit, and never worked in Japan like the "mother law" of
Wagner Act vintage.69 Unions that cut across company lines and enlist
members from all companies in an industry or craft, and even intervene
between labor and management with a permanent political agenda, never
had a chance to gain the loyalty of Japanese company members. Loy-
alty, as well as the power to regulate workers' lives, remained with the
lifetime company employer. The Japanese Socialist Party, Communist
Party, and others seeking the political support of labor, have tried to
exploit a more divisive stance, but they have always remained a decided
minority, unable to command enough general support to govern even in
a coalition. The only recent exception is the majority that these elements
have been able to wrest from the ruling Liberal Democratic Party,
though only in the upper House of Councillors.
Another contributing factor to the strength of the familial firm is
that the loyalty of the lifetime employee has been earned by a systemic
slighting of the lesser companies and temporary employees, as well as of
the shareholders of Japanese listed corporations (from an American
standpoint, there is no equal protection).70 Slighting of shareholders is
something that students of American corporate law can hardly fathom.
American corporate theory is not communal, but is grounded in property
concepts which dictate that American corporations are run for the own-
ers (the shareholders). This translates into a short-term focus by Ameri-
can managers on quarterly dividends. American dividend goals cause a
natural conflict of interest in the relationship between managers to share-
holders on the one hand, and to employees on the other. Wages must be
minimized in order to raise dividends for the boss, the shareholder. The
American shareholder's tendency to vote at the stock exchange keeps
managers focused on dividends. While actual shareholder voting is effec-
tual only exceptionally in the United States and Japan, in the United
States the shareholder's interest in dividends is paramount.
This elemental American corporate theory has no cogency in Japan
for two reasons. First, the core shareholders in virtually all large corpo-
rations, so-called "stable" shareholders, form a solid controlling (though
rarely a majority) group of shareholding financial institutions, banks, in-
surance companies, and other industrials (primarily sister companies) in
a combination known as a keiretsu. Overall, in 1989 less than twenty
percent of listed shares were held by private investors; business corpora-
69. Cf. W.B. GOULD, JAPAN'S RESHAPING OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW 162-66 (1984).
70. J. ABEGGLAN & G. STALK, KAISHA: THE JAPANESE CORPORATION 201 (1985).
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tions held thirty percent and financial institutions (banks and insurers)
held forty-four percent. Foreigners held four percent. While institutions
in the United States hold about seventy percent of listed shares as well,
the Japanese institutions are related sister business corporations, and are
not pension and mutual funds.71
These stable shareholders assure the corporate management, who
are essentially the directors as well, of their control and their positions.
The motive for this manner of shareholding is not the maximization of
dividends, but rather simple control and price appreciation, which has
been obligingly ongoing throughout the last two decades until 1990. By
cross-holding each other's shares (and thus effectively removing them
from the market),72 each company is largely free from outside share-
holder influence on management.
In this establishment of collective supercorporatism, which centers
around public banks controlled by nonlegal administrative guidance,
management's major constituencies become the employee members and
the banking institutions. Nurtured by preferences from the Ministries
and the Bank of Japan, this constituency provides most of the corpora-
tions' capital by loans, rather than by shareholders' equity investments.
This financing pattern, though prevalent in the 1960s and 1970s, is wan-
ing in many successful exporting firms which are now able to generate
much of their own capital without borrowing much from the banks.
Firms can also tap the new and still controlled bond markets of the late
1980s.
A second factor which discredits American corporate theory in Ja-
pan is the debt/equity ratio. Historically since World War H, Japanese
companies have been so highly in favor of debt (typically eighty-five to
ninety percent) that equity has not been of great financial concern. Ironi-
cally, much of the leveraging in the 1980s in America seems to be in
recognition of the merits of this Japanese preference for debt. As long as
loans are forthcoming and dividends continue at a standard stable per-
71. See TOKYO STOCK EXCHANGE, FACT BOOK 60 (1990); JAPAN SECS. REs. INST., SE-
cunrrins MARKETS iN JAPAN (1990). See also Perry, Who Runs Your Company Anyway,
FORTUNE, Sept. 12, 1988, at 140, for rising interest of pension fund managers in management
of corporations whose stock they own.
72. Repeta, Declining Public Ownership of Japanese Industry: A Case of Regulatory Fail-
ure?, 17 LAW IN JAPAN 153 (1984). Only about 20% of the listed shares in Japan are held by
private investors. The rest are held by institutions, but of a very different sort than American
institutions (pension funds, mutual funds, insurance companies, and the like). The important
difference is that the Japanese "institutions" are to a major extent sister companies or lending
institutions, which hold not simply for investment but for power and control, and specifically
to prevent acquisition, especially by foreign interests. As noted below, this is no minor matter.
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centage of low par values in respect to approximate interest rates,
73
outside shareholders are docile and stable shareholders remain stable.
This scheme is facilitated if the market continues to advance year by
year, thus rewarding Japanese shareholders with long-term untaxed capi-
tal gains. The real source of capital is then comprised of retained earn-
ings74 and debt from bank borrowing. Banks are funded by the
notoriously high savings of the people. For a long period, these savings
were essentially forced by a combination of poor social security and no
bank checking accounts or credit for consumers, as well as withholding
of wages, later paid as a bonus.
So long as the interest is paid, a company can be run for the com-
pany and its members, both managers and other permanent employees."
What the forty percent drop in equity prices on the Tokyo Stock Ex-
change in the second half of 1990 may do to this scenario is difficult to
predict, especially if the market drops still lower, or if world reactions
cause greater protectionism targeted against Japanese exports.
Such has been the basic sociology of the typical large, governmen-
tally nourished, export-oriented Japanese corporation listed on the ex-
change during the high growth period. Debt/equity ratios have changed
somewhat, but the cross-shareholdings of the keiretsu is still a major fac-
tor which makes acquisitions and takeovers normally quite impractical,
especially for foreigners. The debt/equity ratio is just one of the difficul-
ties which makes Japan an uncongenial place for foreigners to start a
business, because they must always start from nothing.
In securities markets, cross-shareholding and unenforced securities
laws have meant that the exchanges are extensively used for speculation
in a high velocity, rather thin market. One might suppose that the con-
tinued success of speculation will also depend on continued high growth,
dependent in turn on the continued tolerance for Japanese exports in for-
eign markets with no reciprocation in Japan.
Another difference enhancing the large Japanese firms' export prow-
73. See Chandler, Japan, Acting to Boost Firms' Dividends, Tells Underwriters to Pressure
Clients, Wall St. J., Nov. 7, 1990, at 11. It seems the "Ministry of Finance is putting the
squeeze on Japanese companies that it believes skimp on dividends." Id. Between the lines
this tells us much about the "guidance."
74. Akabori-Shibuya, A Study of the Shareholders' Position in Public Issue Corporations,
10 LAW IN JAPAN 101 (1977).
75. It has been argued that the public corporation financed by equity has outlived its
usefulness in the United States, as the leveraged buy outs and takeovers show in the 1980s.
The private corporations, financed by debt, and run by and for the management are the way of




ess is the weakness of the consumer movement in Japan.76 The consum-
ers, like the employees, are all troopers. This is readily apparent to a
tourist who prices any ordinary consumer item, especially if it is manu-
factured by foreign companies. Prices are uniformly high by American
standards. Japanese consumers put up with prices that would surely
cause a disturbance elsewhere. The most significant effect of their toler-
ance could be that the high prices at home act as a subsidy for the low
prices charged abroad by Japanese companies to gain market entry. No
one has been able to explore this possibility in depth, but the logic is
there, given the high domestic prices and the size of the domestic market.
One reason for the high prices is that there are multiple layers of
entrenched supernumeraries in the distribution system, which act as an-
other impediment to the foreign salesperson. 77 Another reason for con-
sumer tolerance of high prices is simply consumer's acceptance of the
discipline imposed (like a kind of tax) upon them by the heavily producer
subsidized consumer goods regime, bent on vanquishing more open com-
petition abroad.
The point is that the simple, competitive market forces which exist
abroad in a free, consumer-oriented economy, open to imports available
to retail consumers at reasonable prices, do not cause Japanese manage-
ment or retailers to lower consumer prices at home. There also is no
incentive to solicit labor for reduced wages in order to reduce costs or to
pay meaningful dividends to shareholders. The result is that, with share-
holder and consumer interests largely removed to the sidelines, managers
have only one concern-they can run the corporation for increased mar-
ket share and for the benefit of their members, so long as they keep their
bank loans paid. High depreciation, deductible interest, and other policy
favors from government offer other advantages in this producer-subsi-
dized, export-oriented polity.
B. The American Firm: Strictly Business
The sociology of the American firm and its several players--em-
ployees, shareholders, and consumers-is indeed different from the fa-
milial firm, though not necessarily better.
76. For other treatments of the issue, see R. CLARK, THE JAPANESE COMPANY (1979); R.
COLE, JAPANESE BLUE COLLAR: THE CHANGING TRADITION (1971); R. COLE, WORK, MO-
BILITY AND PARTICIPATION (1979); R. DORE, BRITISH FACTORY-JAPANESE FACTORY
(1973); T. ROMLEN, FOR HARMONY AND STRENGTH (1974); T. HANAMI, LABOUR LAW AND
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN JAPAN (1979).
77. This issue was among the matters which Japan undertook to remedy in the Structural
Impediments Initiative Agreement (SII).
1991]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
The American labor relations regime is based on a labor market
built from mobile individuals, not life-long members. The general rule is
to pay for work and work for pay. As in Japan, union influence is declin-
ing in the American workforce, but the union attitude still prevails: do
as little as possible for as much as possible, preserving as much leisure
time as possible for shopping, consuming, and recreation. American
managers, on the other hand, often treat individual workers as commodi-
ties, hiring and firing them like they buy and sell a ton of coal or a load of
lumber. Perhaps this portrait is a bit too stark. Times are changing, but
there still exists a residue of nineteenth century labor-management hostil-
ity in American industry, which is almost perfectly contrived to engender
unproductivity.
Unlike Japan, American management in the 1980s increasingly con-
sists of number crunching MBAs who move from :firm to firm, upward
and onward. If they stay with a firm, it is often in order to pull off a
leveraged buyout, to sell off the corporation's assets, or even to dissolve
the work force. This is unthinkable in Japan. In response to recent criti-
cism of management techniques there may be a new emphasis on produc-
tion managers, but the elite managers of the 1980s and 1990s have
generally not been production people. The managers seem to essentially
move money around, rather than producing quality products for a social
purpose in order to sustain the corporation in competitive business.
Among American shareholders, except for raiders, there are pre-
cious few (aside from recent institutional investor activists) who hold
shares for voting control, unlike the Japanese business establishment. As
in Japan, over seventy percent of listed shares in the United States are
held by institutions. But the institutions in the United States are not
sister companies, and they care little about votes or control. They are
pensions, mutual funds, trusts, and insurance intermediaries with their
sights on the flow of income. This focus influences management, but the
influence is often negative because it generates a short-term interest in
quarterly dividends which keeps stock prices up. Coupled with the stock
option method, which is meant to keep management interested and loyal,
this short-term concern can be devastating for production and mainte-
nance of market share over the long haul.
Unlike the Japanese consumer, the American retail buyer is not dis-
ciplined and docile. He is the king of the marketplace, and is noisy about
barriers and prices. Americans have, and even cherish, their diversity,
Nevertheless, in consumer tastes they are remarkably homogeneous.
They buy the same jeans, eat the same hamburgers, and in general con-
sume the same standardized products throughout the country, small lux-
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ury markets aside. Furthermore, all these consumers are well-financed
with easy loan payments and credit cards. Competitive shopping centers,
discount houses, department stores, and other outlets abound with con-
venient parking lots. Stores are full of foreign and domestic products set
side by side on the shelf or in the warehouse, or in automobile sales-
rooms, for easy price comparison. This market is a huge, accessible, and
unique consumer's market subsidized by tax deductions and credit poli-
cies, antitrust enforcement, openness across the borders, and nondiscrim-
inatory practices in the distribution chain. The United States subsidizes
consumers and importers, not producers. These subsidies have created a
bonanza for Japanese exports.
Little thought is probably given abroad to the heavy transaction
costs that American exporters must pay in tailoring products to small,
segmented foreign markets. In order to sell enough to balance off the
sum of imports by sales to the many small, cash-and-carry markets of
America's trading partners, American exporters must deal with multiple
languages and cultural barriers, as well as small segmented officialdoms.
Only half in jest, it could be said that, but for the service America offers
to foreign sellers by way of its developed mass market, which is well
financed and accessible, perhaps the United States should assess a
surcharge to offset not only its own consumer subsidy costs, but also the
absence of such conveniences from its trading partners' markets.
These contrasting profiles of the underlying sociology of the Ameri-
can and Japanese corporation are sharply drawn in order to support a
final observation: a foreigner's acquisition of a Japanese communal type
firm is practically unthinkable; it is like buying a community which is
highly leveraged and pays few dividends. Acquisitions are important to
convenient market entry, but are not practicable in Japan, the rare excep-
tions that exist notwithstanding."3 Thus, perhaps the most serious bar-
rier to foreign firms existing in Japan is the condition of being forced to
always start from scratch, at the bottom of the ladder. This barrier oc-
curs essentially because buying a share in Japan is not like buying one in
New York. Shares are not fungible even legally, and less so
sociologically.
78. For many insights into the difficulties of the Japanese takeovers, see Rarnseyer, Take-
overs in Japan: Opportunism, Ideology and Corporate Control, 35 UCLA L. REv. 1-64
(1987) [hereinafter Ramseyer, Takeovers in Japan]. For a list of Japanese companies acquired
between 1955 and 1984, see K. ISHIZUMI, ACQUIRING JAPANESE COMPANIES 6-8 (1988). The
most famous skirmishes by an American investor are T. Boon Pickens' experiences with Koito
Mfg. Co., which appear in the news from time to time. Though the largest shareholder, he is
excluded from the board. See Japan Times, Dec. 5, 1990, at 4.
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IV. POLITICAL CONTEXT OF BUSINESS
The differences in the business/government relationship in the polit-
ical context in the United States and Japan is, of course, difficult to cap-
sulize. Nonetheless, there are some highly significant differences, some
of which are outlined below.
79
On the American side, the government has made the antitrust laws
its prime concern in the business world. They are, in essence, America's
economic constitution. The goal is to achieve free enterprise by main-
taining free competition, both domestic and foreign. It would be a chal-
lenge to find any government with a more consistent dedication to a
strong private sector, aside from Hong Kong perhaps. Certainly the gov-
ernment generally eschews entering businesses such as banking, airlines,
utilities, and railroads, which are often public industries elsewhere. The
U.S. government runs the post office and nurtures defense industries,
though not all that well in the view of many. With these minor excep-
tions, Americans have placed their faith in the private sector, with a
modicum of regulation and deregulation, and even some reregulation.
Few seem to trust Washington to pick the winners in America's in-
dustrial structure or to manage any other more positive industrial policy.
Even so, it is obvious that we have an industrial policy, perhaps by de-
fault, and tax policies and other subsidies have had a large role in subsi-
dizing debt, consumers, the over-building of offices, and the rash of
takeovers during the 1980s. These policies contribute to excessive defi-
cits, both public and private, not to mention the trade deficit.
At the same time, suspicion of big business is endemic in American
society, which sustains a high level of support for antitrust enforcement
despite the waxing and waning of resources dedicated to such, and de-
spite the nation's rethinking of the ways to maintain international com-
petitiveness. The United States is certainly wary of any kind of cartels or
industrial associations (except labor unions) which would afford business
any opportunities for price fixing or other forms of restraints on trade.
Beyond the U.S. borders, international competition on a level play-
ing field remains a special and unsolved problem, and largely a romantic
quest. In fact, only recently has it become apparent that the comparative
advantage and the invisible hand of economics have given way to the
79. For a lucid synoptic review of the several models offered in the literature to explain
the party-government-industry nexus, see Murakami, The Japanese Model of Political Econ-
omy, in POLITICAL ECONOMY OF JAPAN, supra note 66, at 56.
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politics of "contrived advantage,"" ° produced by some nations' mercan-
tilist attempts at employing their people at the expense of tilting the play-
ing field. Attempts will continue, presumably, to address these issues
bilaterally (as in the SI agreements), or multilaterally at General Agree-
ments on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) meetings or elsewhere. But to date,
the future of the free world economy is discouraging, as we can see from
the latest set backs in the GATT round. And it seems that this experi-
ence may suggest problems in globalization of securities markets, too.
In Japan, politics and business are much more integrated. The busi-
ness of government is business. As Mr. Peter Drucker"' noticed earlier
than other observers, Japan's trading tactics are also adversarial and
power oriented; it is not just business that Japan is interested in, but con-
trol. National power by dominance of the market is the goal. This
power game is played by using formidable government/business policies
and unique organizational strategies. These strategies, labelled "insular
internationalism" by this author in 1973,82 have not gradually dissolved
in the face of international criticism, but rather have remained a problem
which has gone unaddressed in Tokyo and Washington. They were ad-
dressed recently in the SII agreements, though these agreements are
probably not realistic solutions in their present form, or even in the short
term. This is because the agreements merely identify fundamental do-
mestic problems in both nations related to the level playing field, but
realistic implementation of solutions is not specified.8 3
Japanese Supracorporate Business Organization
As well as relying upon the docile consumer, the stable shareholder,
and the familial worker, the Japanese industrial, export oriented, finan-
cial establishment is supported domestically by a cartel-ike set of unique
organizational forms as well. There are, in other words, not only familial
firms, but also the families of firms, the keiretsu. While not susceptible to
solution by our antitrust laws, they present problems for the outside
competitor. Perhaps the organizational scheme should be treated as
"quasi-state trading" rather than as "free enterprise." 5 This difference
80. Henderson, Access to the Japanese Market, in LAw AND TRADE ISSUES OF THE JAPA-
NESE ECONOMY, supra note 2, at 131.
81. Wall St. J., Apr. 1, 1986, at 11.
82. D. HENDERSON, FOREIGN ENTERPRISE IN JAPAN, supra note 26, at xi.
83. See F'mgleton, supra note 2, at 72.
84. This section is drawn from D. HENDERSON, FOREIGN ENTERPRISE IN JAPAN, supra
note 26, at 91.
85. Id. We need a term for Japanese methods because free enterprise is inept to describe
the Japanese method of dealing in the international arena. It has been called Japan, Inc.,
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is not simply a matter of semantics; it would justify dealing with the
Japanese complex, impervious as it is in manifold ways to foreign firms,
under the rubric of state trading, which provides for compensating de-
vices for dealing with contrived ultratransparent advantages, and for the
lack of reciprocal opportunities. 6 The problem is not that the system
does not work well for Japan: indeed, it explains much of the Japanese
economic miracle. Rather, the problem is that the whole complex is too
nationalistic and contrived to produce a protectionist response from Ja-
pan's trading partners. This destroys freedom in Japan's targeted over-
seas markets, unless of course trading partners are tolerant enough to
allow their manufacturers to be put out of business.
Like personal relations within the firm, the large modem Japanese
enterprise's relations with competitors and affiliates are organized, con-
trolled, and hierarchical in nature. The effective structure reflects the
fact that, since the Meiji period (1868-1912), modern industry has been
an instrument of national policy for developing protected domestic mar-
kets and for winning markets abroad. When Japanese business was
weak, these tactics were perhaps understandable, but now they are be-
coming a predatory and destructive form of mercantilism.
The overall posture is as follows. Within each industry, corporate
participants are ranked by market shares, i.e. the "big three" or "big
five." Each industry also has its trade association and cartels, both for-
mal and informal, culminating in the Keidanren (Federation of Industrial
Associations), which interfaces with government, as its partner in the
game of international competition or conquest. Since much governmen-
tal action is channelled through it and turns on a firm's ranking and
production and export goals, even MITI might be included at the apex of
this business structure. Of course, all major nations have informal rank-
ings for firms and have industry-wide associations.
But there is nothing in the United States like the Japanese melding
adversarial trading, targeting, or insular internationalism, but some of these terms have been
retired from the discourse as "Japan bashing"; still, Japanese tactics are not properly described
as "free enterprise" because of that term's English meaning. Though not state owned, "quasi-
state trading" is suggested for the methods of keiretsu to indicate the high level of governmen-
tal complicity on the one hand and tolerance for collusion among companies on the other, so
that the outsider is confronted with something quite different than the usual competition be-
tween individual units of business found in the United States. For a new example of grappling
with this intractable problem, see D. KENDRICK, WHERE COMMUNISM WORKS: THE Svc-
CESS OF COMPETITIVE COMMUNISM IN JAPAN (Tokyo 1990).
86. For state trading methods, see Allen, State Trading and Economic Warfare, 24 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBs. 256 (1959); Baban, State Trading and the GATT, 11 J. WORLD TRADE
334 (1977); Allan & Hiscock, East-West Trade: The Philosophies and Practicalities of State
Trading, 8 MONASH U.L. REv. 135 (1982).
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of business and government leadership (both politicians and bureaucrats)
at the top. Business campaign funding, along with the gerrymandered
rural vote, has kept the Liberal Democratic Party in power for decades.
This business and political combination has, in turn, produced a steady
growth and prosperity for Japanese business that is the envy of the
world. Paradoxically, though Japanese banks and top businesses are
wealthy, individual Japanese citizens are not, unless they travel abroad to
consume. This should indicate the underlying purposes of Japanese pol-
icy. Paradoxically, it is the U.S. government, through the SI1 negotia-
tions, not the Japanese government, which has tried to come to the aid of
the Japanese consumer.
Another basic feature of the overall Japanese business hierarchy is
the horizontal split between the giants at the apex and the microbes at
the base, which populate respectively the modem and traditional (or sub-
contracting strata) of this dualistic economic pyramid. There are, for
example, about one million KK corporations in Japan, and about the
same number of YG, reflecting a per capita rate of business incorporation
roughly the same as that in the United States. The big business world,
consisting of approximately 1800 listed corporations with export prow-
ess, is highly oligopolistic, with markets dominated by four to eight firms
and quite exclusive (though less so than before World War 11). In the
early postwar years, the government's industrial policies efficiently
shaped oligopolistic markets in most export products, with an eye to-
wards competitiveness abroad. Significantly, the industrial, political, and
bureaucratic national policymakers have had an admirable prescience to
encourage moves toward the higher value-added industries, thus wisely
refusing to support failing sectors.87 This stands in sharp contrast to the
American practice of protecting textile industries and the like.
Historically, a few selected firms were promoted and protected in
importing high technology.8 At the same time, foreign technology was
inadequately protected by forced licensing or a toothless patent system, 89
the latter having been upgraded by stages only as Japan's own technol-
ogy, whether foreign derived or otherwise, has come to require protec-
tion. These favored companies were allowed preferential financing,
87. See R. DORE, FLEXIBLE RIGIDITIES: INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND STRUCTURAL AD-
JUSTMENT IN THE JAPANESE ECONOMY 1970-1980, at 153 (1986).
88. See M. MoRITANI, JAPANESE TECHNOLOGY: GETTING THE BEST FOR THE LEAST
(1982). The FAX machine is but the latest of American inventions, the manufacture of which
is exploited now almost exclusively in Japan. See Drucker, Marketing 101for a Fast-Changing
Decade, Wall St. J., Nov. 20, 1990, at A20, col. 3.
89. This too was addressed in the SH Agreement, supra note 7.
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foreign exchange, and the critical foreign technology needed to build Jap-
anese capacity in each successive line of profitable products before any
foreign inventors could gain access to the market. The result was that, in
the beginning, only Japan's manufacturers had acce;s to both the Ameri-
can market and their own domestic market, the second largest in the
world, from which foreigners were excluded by various means. This
often meant that the advantage of scale (in both domestic and foreign
markets) was possessed only by Japanese producers, who attacked the
low-priced, mass-produced end of the product lines first. In addition, it
is now well-known that, even after the restrictive foreign exchange law
was changed in 1980 to allow foreigners more market access, the under-
lying social, business, and banking organizations have remained formida-
ble barriers to foreign investment and acquisitions.
There are two kinds of supracorporate groupings in this unique or-
ganizational structure. First, most firms have joined into the keiretsu,
wherein their shared banking and investing institutions ration out scarce
investment capital and other services. We must emphasize that these
keiretsu 9 o are not family controlled firms like the prewar zaibatsu by the
same names (e.g. Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo). The postwar organiza-
tional principle is a confederacy using the "one-set" technique. This
means that, typically, each keiretsu tries to nurture, besides its own ser-
vice core, one major firm in each kind of manufacturing endeavor (an oil
company, a trading company, an electrical machinery company, a min-
ing company, and the like), so that there is a whole cross-industrial
spread fostering much horizontal and vertical business within a group
complex controlled by cross-shareholding and informal ties, but there is
relatively less competition intramurally. A multitude of small subcon-
tracting firms manufacture parts and render other services also allied to
each major industrial; this subcomplex of the keiretsu is often called an
"enterprise keiretsu." This small enterprise sector is subjected to the rig-
ors of longer hours, inferior finance, less security, and lower pay. Ameri-
cans could easily identify this treatment as a constitutional problem: the
lack of equal protection.
The second kind of supracorporate grouping is the industry-wide
association, which organizes competing producers in each industry for
regular governmental liaison and cooperative action, including the crea-
90. See KIGYO KEIRETSU SORAN (Shukan Toyo Keizai ed. 1991) (showing in 752 pages
of detail the labyrinthine mutual overlaps of stock holding, loan sources, and personnel ex-
changes in the Japanese corporate complex). There is a list of the leading keiretsu and their
member companies as they existed in the 1970s in D. HENDERSON, FOREIGN ENTERPRISE IN
JAPAN, supra note 26, at 373.
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tion of cartels9 1 on a national scale. The goal is to increase the domestic
edge against outsiders, especially in the purchase of raw materials. Nu-
merous Japanese cartels function for export and import through these
associations, especially in international business. The internal workings
of these industry-wide associations are not transparent and remain as im-
pervious to outsiders as to antitrust enforcement.
Both types of supracorporate organizations are remarkably elabo-
rated in Japan to serve group or national purposes transcending the ca-
pacities of individual firms. They are remarkably free of antitrust
enforcement.9" Basically, the keiretsu, embracing no competitors, is like
a headless conglomerate, without enough common ownership to tie it
together at the top, but with enough cross-shareholding to fend off troub-
lesome outside shareholders.93 The trade associations and cartels, on the
other hand, bring together all competitive producers in a given industry
for governmental and industrial production and import-export strategies,
as well as for investment allocations, orderly marketing, prevention of
excess competition, or fortification at the business level against foreign
invasions. Both of these supracorporate organizations are so crucial to
operations that no Japanese firm would embark on an important venture
without consulting the government, the banks, the trade associations,
and perhaps the keiretsu presidents' meeting. Such factors affect, some-
times definitively, market shares that foreigners might hope to attain by
acquisition, joint venture, or alliance. Certainly no foreign firm should
venture into the Japanese business world without exploring the specifics
of these supracorporate systems. Firms must be very concerned with the
marginal position they would occupy in the Japanese economy when
forced to start from scratch in such a closed complex.
What this all means for the local securities markets, and more im-
portantly for global securities trading, is not yet apparent. Nor has the
matter yet been adequately studied abroad, despite the attention it has
received in the SII negotiations.
It seems clear enough that the joint government/business push
abroad will be in financial power and control, not just trade or simple
corporate profit. Funding for foreigners is still a major problem in Ja-
91. See Yamamura, Success that Sourec Administrative Guidance and Cartels in Japan,
in POLICY AND TRADE ISSUES OF THE- JAPANESE ECONOMY 77 (K. Yamamura ed. 1982).
92. See Iyori, Antitrust and Industrial Policy in Japan: Competition & Cooperation, in
LAW AND TRADE ISSUES OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMY, supra note 2, at 56.
93. See Graven, In Corporate Japan, Cross Shareholding Remains a Useful Defense Mech-
anism, Wall St. J., Nov. 17, 1989, at All (regarding the Tokyu group).
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pan, as is the price of business sites and a nearly unfathomable distribu-
tion system.
In sum, the Japanese business complex is a good and effective na-
tionalistic system. But it is highly adversarial and market share and
power oriented, and thus has more political overtones than are usually
perceived by Americans who naturally think of the government as simply
a referee and assume that the profit motive is the company's bottom line.
Whether these peculiar Japanese methods are consistent with the ideal-
ism of a free enterprise based world economy is the real concern which
has been recently debated abroad with increasing vigor.
V. FOUR CULTURAL CONTRASTS OF SIGNIFICANCE
TO SECURITIES LAW
After reviewing some contextual differences (whether legal, social,
economic, or political) in the methods of corporate business in the
United States and Japan, a pertinent question arises: how many of these
differences are explained by our respective cultures (i.e., the language,
religion, and philosophy, as embedded in popular values and attitudes)?
94
Interesting as the question may be, the purpose of this study is more
limited.95 We will discuss four cultural aspects which are especially sig-
94. This is a simple definition of culture for the purposes of this paper. There is, however,
considerable debate among Japan experts about the extent of cultural influences on recent
Japanese business successes. Much of the debate is simply semantics, or latently definitional
(le., what is culture, or more importantly to some single-causation exponents, the question is:
What is causative and what is derivative?). Such academic categories (economic, political,
social, legal, cultural, etc.) are only analytical conveniences at best, not really worth doing
battle for, when a stipulative definition will usually do for the job of analyzing an ongoing
interrelated single problem. It is thus convenient to emphasize these four topics at the end of
this analysis and call them cultural factors for the limited purpose of raising the issues, They
seem especially important to business comparisons. They are "cultural" because, though inter-
active with other aspects of Japan and the United States and though changeable over time
being, derivative as well as causative, they are more abiding and slower and harder to change
than some legal, political, and social contrivances or economic policies previously discussed.
They do have enormous interactive effect on business in the two countries at any given time.
For a very insightful treatment of litigation and its many barriers in Japan on antitrust, see
Ramseyer, The Costs of the Consensual Myth: Antitrust Enforcement and Institutional Barriers
to Litigation in Japan, 94 YALE L.J. 604 (1985). Much of Ramseyer's message is equally
relevant to litigation as a tool of securities enforcement in Japan.
95. Note that it is easy to explain too much by emphasizing the peculiarities of Japanese
culture, but, whether the culture is causative or derivative is not the only question. Nor is it
sensible to ignore differences in popular attitudes and beliefs while quibbling about the extent
of their significance. For cogent economic analysis that shows the dangers of overreliance on
cultural explanation, see Ramseyer, Legal Rules in Repeated Deals: Banking in the Shadow of
Defection in Japan, to be published in 20 J. LEGAL STUD. (1991), and Ramseyer, Takeovers In
Japan, supra note 78, at 2-6. Ramseyer's several works generally do much to illuminate the
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nificant contextually to the way corporate business is done in both coun-
tries: (1) attitudes toward government (or authority, generally);
(2) popular attitudes toward justiciable law; (3) attitudes toward busi-
ness; and (4) the business/government relationship. All four of these are
presumably nurtured by (and changing with) the ongoing social and cul-
tural milieu.
In the main, the American tradition is to distrust authority and gov-
ernment. 6 American business, especially, doubts government's judg-
ment in industrial policy, though it inconsistently and incessantly lobbies
for special favors. The latest popular attitude towards taxes simply re-
flects a past consensus that government does not return value for the tax
dollar. The people can get more for their dollar in the market. Ameri-
cans believe in Lord Acton's maxim that power corrupts, and absolute
power corrupts absolutely. In addition, Americans are very individualis-
tic, and their society thus does not provide communal groups such as
those in Japan, as alternatives to law for maintaining order and settling
disputes.
In Japan, a traditional ideology supports a fundamentally different
view of authority, especially of bureaucracy. More generally, govern-
ment is seen by the populace as essentially paternal, competent, and
trustworthy. In American rhetoric, Japanese view their governors (es-
sentially the bureaucracy) like Plato's philosopher kings. Public servants
are considered morally superior to private citizens;97 they form a mer-
itocracy based on academic prowess which leads them to the Law De-
partment at Tokyo University, the main incubator of power in big
business as well as in government. This can be traced directly to a polit-
ical philosophy derived originally from Confucianistic thought. Its legiti-
macy is derived at the lowest social level, from power relationships to the
paternal authority of the traditional family, which serves as a model and
carries over to officialdom at higher levels. In this orthodox structure,
rulers are presumed to be virtuous, wise, and beneficent. The mode of
governance is thus based on status and authority; the method is strictly
informal and administrative, rather than justifiably legal. Accordingly,
hierarchy is all-pervasive in Japanese daily governance; duty and obedi-
interrelationships between the Japanese bureaucracy's dominant role through extra-legal gui-
dance and litigation (justiciable law).
96. For a survey finding that 64% of Americans find the government less than trustwor-
thy, see Beltway Bashing Is on the Rise Again, Wall St. J., Feb. 17, 1989, at A16, col. I.
97. The slogan kanson minpi (making much of government and nothing of the people)
expresses the elitist tradition well enough, and at the same time defines the difficulty of devel-
oping the important western idea of the "public servant" in the postwar bureaucracy.
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ence to superiors is required. There is thus little concern with due pro-
cess, a concept from another world.
In Japanese governance, administrative guidance (gydsei shido), not
justiciable law, is the predominant instrument of bureaucratic power.
But administrative guidance should not be regarded as law. It is at best
alegal, and at worst illegal.98 It is in no way related to the rule of law in
the regulatory area. Clear as this really is, there is still some muddled
thinking about the concept of guidance. It needs to be understood partic-
ularly by foreigners, because guidance does not work well for the out-
sider who has no group to join and no authoritative beneficence to
readily invoke.
Even though Japanese guidance may be congenial to Japanese con-
ceptions of authority (and how it ought to be exercised), it must be
clearly recognized in Japan and abroad as a major barrier to the legal
clarity and predictability demanded by global security markets encom-
passing non-Japanese investors.
A. Law
While justiciable law is at the center of American culture, it is new,
shallow, and of peripheral importance in Japan,99 especially in business
regulation. For better or for worse, individualism built on justiciable
rights is the bedrock ethos of American culture. This means that justici-
able law has a much higher value and deeper efficacy in American cul-
ture than it does today in Japan. Japanese are always selflessly immersed
in their group, whether at home or at work. Perhaps this is why it is
frequently said that "Japanese are equality-minded rather than liberty-
minded. ' 'I"" These psychological differences are not easily perceived or
98. For a finding that MITI guidance was illegal in the Oil Production Restriction Case,
and was therefore not a defense in this criminal case, see Japan v. Sekiyu Renmei, 983 HANJI
22 (Sept. 26, 1980).
99. A fresh and comprehensive analysis of the role of law in Japan may be found in J.
HALEY, AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER: LAW AND THE JAPANESE: PARADOX (in press 1991),
See also Fujikura, A Comparative View of Legal Culture in Japan and the United States, 16
LAW IN JAPAN 129 (1983) (M. Smith trans.); T.B. STEPHENS, TIlE CHmNESE DISCIPLINARY
SYSTEM: THE MIXED COURT OF SHANGHAI (in press 1991), for analysis and contrasts be-
tween a western legal system and the disciplinary system (without "law") used to maintain
order and resolve disputes in the Confucianistic society of Chin., Stephens shows enough
differences to support his position that both systems should not have the same English name
(i.e., "law"). The position is cogent in discussing Japanese social control, as well as the activity
of the bureaucracy by way of "administrative guidance." See Haley, Introduction: Legal vs.
Social Control, 17 LAW IN JAPAN 1 (1984).




precisely measurable because they are imbedded in both nations' lan-
guage, culture, innate patterns of thought, and behavior. Needless to
say, attitudes towards authority and law are linked. Americans distrust
government, so they rely on law to limit its power.
These attitudes condition the social impact of statutes, such as the
securities laws, which often, on their verbal faces, appear as almost iden-
tical formulae for individual behavior in both Japan and the United
States. But the impact of law on Japanese society is quite diluted; Japan
is best seen as, in larger part, socially, and not legally governed.' 0 t Not
to perceive this in the Japanese rhetoric and not to act accordingly, is, for
the foreigner, simply to overlook the essence of Japanese governance.
Again, this is because law as an idea and law as an institution con-
firming justiciable rights, are concepts alien to Japan's administrative tra-
dition; it was therefore new in 1875, when the first western-styled courts
were instituted. Individualism, rights, law, and courts have required de-
cades to become operational in society, even to the present degree. Of
course, Japanese society has other, perhaps better, authoritative ways to
channel behavior and resolve disputes. Indeed conciliation (chtel),1'°
the traditional social method of settling disputes, was moved into the
courts and now operates to resolve a major portion of cases even when
first filed as lawsuits. Such methods consist of intimate communal habits
of maintaining traditional patterns of conduct based on authority and
discipline, not law. This system is generally uncongenial, even incompre-
hensible, to outsiders at the threshold. Accordingly, entry as a member
is extraordinarily difficult. On the other hand, outsiders, as guests, are
exceedingly well treated. Their foreign business efforts inside Japan are
not met with the same cordiality.
10 3
One can also argue that the communal or social ways provide better
governance,' °4 but that argument goes to the well-being of insiders, and
101. F. UPHAm, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN POSTWAR JAPAN 166-204 (1987) (calling
it "informality and verticality" and demonstrating how adroitly the bureaucracy, through con-
sultations and consensus, not only tames the recalcitrants but almost completely keeps the law
and the judiciary out of the regulatory area).
102. See D. HENDERSON, 2 CONCILIATION AND JAPANESE LAW: TOKUGAWA AND MOD-
ERN 207 (1965).
103. R.J. HUDDLESTON, GAUIN KAISHA: RUNNING A FOREIGN BUSINESS IN JAPAN ch. 2
(1990) (on personnel).
104. The growth of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) in the United States during the
past decade is striking evidence of popular recognition of the limitation of law, lawsuits, and
lawyers, though actually the lawyers are promoting ADR in order to retain their turf in the
dispute settlement field. Of course ADR is sociology, not jurisprudence. When I did my study
of Japanese Conciliation, there was nothing in the legal indices on the subject. Though ADR
was born only in the 1970s, and now there is even an ABA Committee on it, courses on ADR
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not to the accommodation of an international trading system. It may be
that the dry logical legalism of American culture is excessive, but entry
by outsiders into the American business environment is easier. In
America, with the advent of the "me generation," communal instincts
have recently been diluted. The communal sense of balance between
public and private concerns have been historically rooted in the Ameri-
can family, the church, and small towns, all of which have weakened by
degree in recent times. One could argue that the American self-indulgent
and individualistic bias, if that is what it is, began at least as far back as
1800, based on the self-reliance and rugged individualism required to
tame the western frontier as it moved from the Atlantic to the Pacific,
and was recycled back to the modern disorder and arnomie of New York.
Tokyo does not have that disorder, and it does and should make Ameri-
cans wonder about the balance and priority of rights and order. The
growing American interest in alternative dispute resolution is clear evi-
dence of a recent reassessment of the social utility of our legal
processes.' 05
B. Business and Culture
Almost as fundamental is the difference in the attitudes of Ameri-
cans and Japanese toward work and business, especially big business.
For over a century, it seems that many Americans have had a profound
distrust of big business, city slickers, and Wall Street.10 6 However justi-
fied this suspicion of American business may be, it is also unfortunate.
The importance of faith in the private sector for the preservation of the
basic institutions of property and the market is obvious. Surely a balance
between the private and public sector gains importance from the events
of the day, which disclose the tragedies of authoritarian socialism and of
excess faith in the state and the public sector.
Yet, to this day there is much distrust in America of Wall Street,
banking, and big business, not only because of their effect on the market,
but also for their influence on government. Another, more recent, mani-
festation of American antibusiness sentiment is the growth of strict prod-
uct liability law and punitive damages against business defendants. The
in most law schools, and even a BNA Alternative Dispute Resolution Reporter, to mention
only a few signs of how it is flourishing on the shortcomings of litigation. See Burger, Isn't
There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A.J. 274 (1982).
105. Brazil, A Close Look at Three Court-Sponsored ADR Programs: Why They Exist, How
They Operate, What They Deliver, and Whether They Threaten Important Values, in TIs.
ROLE OF THE JURY IN CIVIL DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1990).
106. See L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAWS 11 (2d ed. 1985).
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scandals surrounding Wall Street insiders Ivan Boesky and Michael
Milken"°7 (as well as the savings and loan excesses symbolized by the
Keating five) are examples of the reasons for this tradition of distrust. It
is a major element of our culture, and stands in striking contrast to popu-
lar views of business in Japan.
Grouped into keiretsu and interfacing directly with government, the
large Japanese manufacturing and exporting companies especially enjoy
the reputation of heroes vanquishing the foreign competition for the good
of the populace and the glory of the country. Ironically, the accomplish-
ments of these giants of the corporate world reap the admiration earlier
bestowed upon the haughty samurai of days past, and similar military
rhetoric is used daily in the Japanese media to describe international ex-
ploits and conquests abroad.
American views are mixed. Deplorable as it may be, there is grow-
ing sentiment in the United States that, while American soldiers fight for
the security of Japanese fuel lines, the Japanese fight for financial domi-
nance with their savings. There is also a growing realization that eco-
nomics and defense are linked, and a growing opinion that Japan is not
accepting responsibility for the international balance of power commen-
surate with its economic rewards from the balance of trade.108
Japanese companies command an admiration and loyalty, akin to
military discipline, evidenced in concrete terms by the lifetime commit-
ments of their employees, as well as the six day work weeks and twelve
hour day. The obedient work force is too tired for leisure and too busy to
consume, so it saves, exports, and invests its earnings abroad. Recently,
dedication to the company has gven rise to a new phenomenon called
karoshi (death from overwork),1°" which has surfaced as a national prob-
lem in the form of widows' compensation claims for husbands who are
seldom seen, but who expire from overwork imposed by a social web of
duties derived from the husband's ultimate concern, the company.
C. The Government Business Relationship
Big business and government meld at the top of the social pyramid
in Japan. The Japanese government is much more supportive of business
107. Symbol of the 90s, Wall St. J., Nov. 23, 1990, at A8, col. 1.
108. Johnson, The Problem of Japan in an Era of Structural Change, IHJ BULL., Autumn
1989, at 3; see also Henderson, Japan: Economic Aspects of National Security and Its Impact
on United States Security, 1 PUB. L.F. 99 (1981).
109. See T. Ueyanagi, Death From Overwork: Working Hours Laws and Workers' Com-
pensation Law in Japan and the United States 57 (mimeo ed. 1990) (available at the University
of Washington).
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in foreign and domestic policy than is the United States government, de-
spite some shifts by the United States toward deregulation and probusi-
ness policies during the 1980s.
Reverse support is also evident in Japan: big business (and farmers)
support the political campaigns of the ruling party quite directly. The
system has been called a one-and-a-half party system, because of the con-
tinuous rule of the Liberal Democratic Party since the early 1950s. The
subsidized rural vote makes this possible because the current electoral
districting weights some rural votes at a four-to-one ratio compared to
some urban districts. Yet, districts remain unchanged by the Diet, even
though the Supreme Court has declared the current districting a viola-
tion of the Constitution. 1 ' Also, direct campaign financing by corporate
gifts was approved as constitutional by the Supreme Court of Japan in
the case of Arita V Kojima,11' which upheld a contribution of the then
Yawata Steel Co. to the Liberal Democratic Party. Further, top bureau-
crats look to private business for management positions at the end of
their government tenure. This symbiosis of government and big business
in Japan affects all aspects of business and finance, including the securi-
ties exchanges, and is apparently approved or condoned by the populace,
though recently strained by the Recruit scandals. To repeat, in Japan,
the business of government is business, and it pays well for all. The price
is the strain on the international financial, security, and trading systems.
VI. CONCLUSION
To summarize, there are major differences in the Japanese and
American legal systems: federal versus unitary; civil law versus common
law; and guidance versus justiciable law. There are important differences
in the specific features of the corporate law of the two countries. Also,
there-are very basic cultural differences in the way Americans and Japa-
nese view business, even collusive business, and how they view the gov-
ernment/business relationship. The American popular attitudes toward
things as basic as government, authority, and even law are vastly differ-
ent than those in Japan.
By assuming these basic traits to be tolerably similar, Americans
have consistently been hoisted on their own legalistic petards in the post-
war period when trying to deal with Japan by relying on ethnocentric
110. Kurokawa v. Chiba Prefecture Election Commission, 30 Minshi 323 (Apr. 14, 1976);
39 Minshii 1100 (July 17, 1985). These cases and others on malapportionment are discussed In
J. HALEY & D. HENDERSON, 2 LAW AND LEGAL PROCESS IN JAPAN 27 (1988).
111. 24 Minshii 625 (June 24, 1970).
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penchants for promises, contracts, and laws promoting a free world econ-
omy. These concepts are not understood in the western sense on the
other side of the Pacific. International legal regimes, bereft of enforce-
ment mechanisms and addressed to uniformity in securities markets, are
also not likely to accomplish much by law. Agreements or statutes made
without an understanding of the contextual contrasts affecting enforce-
ment will be yet another trans-Pacific illusion.

